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Abstract
The de-identification of publicly released datasets that contain personal information
is necessary to preserve personal privacy. One such de-identification algorithm, k-
anonymization, reduces the risk of the re-identification of such datasets by requiring
that each combination of information-revealing traits be represented by at least k differ-
ent records in the dataset. However, this requirement may skew the resulting dataset by
preferentially deleting records that contain more rare information-revealing traits. This
paper investigates the amount of bias and loss of utility introduced into an online edu-
cation dataset by the k-anonymization process, as well as suggesting future directions
that may decrease the amount of bias introduced during de-identification procedures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Although the prevalence of personal data collection in medical, educational, and other
fields enables valuable data analysis, the public release of these datasets for research
purposes has necessitated policies that protect the privacy of subjects whose informa-
tion is contained in these datasets. Current legal standards have equated privacy to a
notion of anonymity, allowing private data to be shared about people, as long as there
exists a reasonable amount of uncertainty associated with the identity of such persons.
Medical data, for example, is protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (HIPAA), which requires that health records be cleared of highly-sensitive
fields like names and telephone numbers and that the dataset be altered such that any
given subject’s risk of being re-identified from the released dataset is “statistically small”
[1]. Similar laws also provide privacy guidelines for the release of educational, internet,
financial, and other data.
Various de-identification procedures have been developed that define standards by which
datasets must be altered such that a given subject’s maximum risk of being re-identified
falls below a given threshold. By modifying the original dataset, however, the de-
identification process often results in a dataset that generates less accurate analyses
than does the original data. This points to a necessary trade-off between privacy and
the use of big data – the greater the required standard of anonymity, the greater the
opportunity for a dataset to be altered in a way that lowers the accuracy of the resulting
data analyses.
1
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One scenario in which de-identification altered the properties of a dataset can be seen in
the context of edX data, a massive open online course platform providing free classes to
those who sign up online. After edX student data was de-identified in order to comply
with Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) law, basic statistics about
student activity and performance changed considerably, including the mean and corre-
lation of various course performance characteristics [2]. Similar phenomena have also
been observed with datasets in the advertising and pharmaceutical industries [3].
Optimizing the de-identification process in order to maximize the accuracy of analyses
is challenging for multiple reasons. First, it usually cannot be known in advance what
other datasets a given adversary may have, and therefore it is difficult to select which
characteristics a dataset should be anonymized with respect to. Second, the analyses
that researchers will perform – and therefore the attributes of the dataset whose accu-
racy should be optimized – are often difficult to predict in advance. Even if columns of
interest could be predicted, optimizing for the representativeness of a certain attribute to
the original dataset may come at the cost of decreasing the representativeness of other
attributes, which creates distortions in correlations between attributes. One possible
solution is to release multiple de-identified datasets, each optimizing for the accuracy of
a specific attribute of the data. However, since the release of multiple datasets may, in
combination, violate the given anonymity standard, this may necessitate each individual
dataset to have an even stricter anonymity standard than if a single, optimal dataset
were released.
Tiancheng Li and Ninghui Li highlight that publishing de-identified datasets represents
a sacrifice of societal benefit for individual privacy gain. In this case, societal gain is rep-
resented by the knowledge obtained by performing analyses on these datasets, whereas
privacy loss is defined as the information that an adversary could gain about a particular
subject by joining the dataset with an outside dataset [4]. In developing and analyzing
the efficacy of different de-identification procedures and requirements, the desired bal-
ance with regard to this spectrum must be taken into account.
This paper will explore the effect of a de-identification procedure, k-anonymization, on
the statistical properties and relationships of the resulting dataset. The edX dataset is
analyzed with the goal of identifying specific characteristics of the original dataset that
may contribute to the amount of statistical bias introduced during the k-anonymization
process. In this paper, we define statistical bias as the difference between a given at-
tribute’s mean in the original dataset and in the de-identified dataset. This specific case
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study hopes to lend insights into the mechanisms present within de-identification meth-
ods that tend to bias data, and provides suggestions on future work that may minimize
the amount of statistical bias that is introduced in these datasets during de-identification.
Chapter 2
Defining de-identification
Any dataset containing information about individual subjects will contain records (rows)
with attributes (columns) that fall into at least one of the following categories [5] [6]:
Definition 2.1 (Identifier). An attribute that contains explicitly identity-revealing in-
formation. Examples include a subject’s name or social security number.
Definition 2.2 (Quasi-identifier). Attributes that contain information that may par-
tially reveal identity through the linking of these quasi-identifiers with external data
that share the same quasi-identifiers, as illustrated in the diagram below [7]. Examples
include gender or state of residence.
Figure 2.1: This diagram illustrates how quasi-identifiers can be used by an adversary
in order to reveal extra information about a person by linking two datasets together.
Definition 2.3 (Sensitive attribute). Attributes that can potentially cause societal or
personal harm if linked with an identifier. Examples include medical diagnoses like HIV
or cancer.
Definition 2.4 (Nonsensitive attribute). Attributes that are not sensitive.
4
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The below dataset illustrates examples of each of the above-described types of attributes.
Social security number (SSN) is the sole identifier in this dataset, because it is the
only attribute that can singly be used to identify a person from a given record. Zip
code, age, and nationality are all quasi-identifiers because, if joined with an external
dataset, they may be used to reveal more information about an individual corresponding
to a given record. In this case, condition is a sensitive attribute because, if it were
to be revealed, this would pose a privacy violation that could cause personal harm.
Non-sensitive attributes are therefore social security number (SSN), zip code, age, and
nationality.
SSN Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 641-49-6370 13053 27 US Heart Disease
2 929-69-9710 13053 29 Canada Heart Disease
3 236-94-7153 13053 14 US Viral Infection
4 926-47-9572 13053 21 Mexico Viral Infection
5 042-48-1725 14857 42 US Viral Infection
6 528-41-7495 14857 63 England Heart Disease
7 925-41-0497 14857 44 China Viral Infection
8 640-25-1430 14857 52 China Viral Infection
9 482-55-1927 13060 33 Germany Cancer
10 492-20-4710 13060 30 Switzerland Cancer
11 729-46-1031 13060 39 France Cancer
12 294-10-4528 13060 32 US Cancer
Table 2.1: An example of a dataset containing personally identifiable information.
SSN is an identifier. Quasi-identifiers are zip code, age, and nationality. Condition is a
sensitive attribute. Nonsensitive attributes are zip code, age, and nationality [8].
Privacy protection of datasets like this may be approached from two angles: either 1.
limiting the use of the original dataset, including restrictions either on the people who
are granted access or on the methods of distribution, or 2. technical modifications that
allow open access to an anonymized version of the original dataset whose risk of re-
identification through linking with outside datasets is determined to be minimal. These
two angles are discussed in greater detail below.
2.1 Limits on the use of data
In order to protect the privacy of individuals included in a dataset, one of the most
straightforward approaches is simply to restrict access to the dataset. This may include
the enforcement of strict limits regarding with whom this data can be shared and how
aggregate the data findings have to be before being released. Such restrictions, however,
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are often hard to enforce, especially with digital datasets that are very easily mass-
distributed. Once such a privacy breach occurs, it can be nearly impossible to retract
the data from people with unauthorized access. For this reason, sensitive datasets often
have to be released in a controlled manner that tracks who has access to the data.
An alternative approach toward systematically preventing the abuse of sensitive data
is called dynamic anonymization and is discussed by Xiaokui Xiao et al. Under this
approach, a statistical database (StatDB) provides a user with aggregated query results
against a database with personally identifiable information, such that the combination
of all data provided to each given user never violates a pre-specified de-identification
standard. Such a database uses one of three methods in order to answer other queries:
I. Query restriction. The refusal to answer queries that disclose sensitive information.
II. Output perturbation. The addition of noise to query result such that no sensitive
exact values are compromised.
III. Data modification. The output of a table that has been anonymized to a pre-
specified standard and that maintains the anonymity of all of the information that
has been queried to date.
The strengths of such a system are its ability to manage the amount of information that
each user has queried and therefore to never release information that would compromise
the pre-specified anonymity level of the data. However, as a given user performs more
queries, the computational cost to return new queries monotonically increases due to
the need to check for adherence to de-identification standards of an increasing number
of records. Furthermore, the representativeness of query results to the original dataset
tends to decrease as a user queries more, since all data collected by the user to date
must collectively satisfy given de-identification standards [9].
2.2 Technical approaches toward data protection
Unlike privacy procedures that focus on restricting access to personally identifiable or
sensitive data, technical approaches toward de-identification aim to generate an “alter-
nate” version of a given dataset with personally identifiable information such that the
risk of re-identifying an individual contained in this dataset is minimal. This is accom-
plished through the complete removal of identifier attributes like name and SSN, along
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with alterations to the dataset, as specified by each de-identification scheme, that min-
imize the risk of re-identification.
Re-identification most commonly occurs when data is combined with an outside source
via shared quasi-identifier attributes in order to reproduce identifier attributes in the
de-identified dataset. For example, consider the example medical dataset presented to
the bottom left, along with the “external” Census data at the right that contains infor-
mation on all three of the residents of the zip code 13053.
The two datasets, in combination, reveal that the third record in the left dataset belongs
to George Leary, since his zip code and age match with that of the third record.
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 13051 21 US Heart Disease
2 13052 29 Canada Heart Disease
3 13053 14 US Viral Infection
4 13051 21 US Viral Infection
Name Zip Code Age
John Abbott 13053 18
George Leary 13053 14
Jane Wentworth 13053 35
↓
Name Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
3 George Leary 13053 14 US Viral Infection
Table 2.2: Illustration of the re-identification that is enabled if an adversary has
access to more than one dataset, one of which contains identifier attributes (such as
name, in this case). The combination of datasets in this example enable George Leary
to be re-identified, therefore revealing his medical condition, which was previously a
sensitive attribute.
De-identification schemes attempt to minimize the chance of this re-identification. Be-
low, some of the most common de-identification schemes are defined and explored.
2.3 De-identification schemes
2.3.1 k-anonymity
Re-identification was possible in the above example because there was only one individual
in the medical dataset whose zip code and age matched that of the right table. If there
had been two records in which an individual had the zip code of 13053 and age of 14,
then there would have only been a 12 chance of correctly guessing which record belonged
to George Leary. This leads to the concept of an equivalence class:
Definition 2.5 (Equivalence class). An equivalence class describes a set of records that
contains identical values for their quasi-identifiers [10].
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For example, in the previous example, records 1 and 4 belong to the same equivalence
class because their values for the three quasi-identifiers are identical: zip code of 13051,
age of 21, and nationality of US:
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 13051 21 US Heart Disease
4 13051 21 US Viral Infection
The concept of k-anonymity relies upon the concept that, by controlling the size of
equivalence classes, re-identification can be hindered. If, for example, the smallest equiv-
alence class of a certain dataset contains 5 members, then in most cases an adversary
with a linkable dataset will have at most a 15 probability of linking a specific record with
a record from an outside dataset, since each member of the equivalence class is identical
in terms of its quasi-identifiers. The formal definition of k-anonymity follows:
Definition 2.6 (k-anonymity). A dataset is k-anonymous if the size of the smallest
equivalence class is equal to or greater than k.
Equivalently, k-anonymity can also be expressed as the requirement that the informa-
tion released in a single record about a person is indistinguishable from at least k-1
distinct individuals in the dataset in terms of its quasi-identifiers [7]. For datasets that
are required by law to satisfy k-anonymity before release, the value of k may often be de-
termined by law or corporate policy, with a higher value of k corresponding to a stricter
privacy standard.
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 130** <30 * Heart Disease
2 130** <30 * Heart Disease
3 130** <30 * Viral Infection
4 130** <30 * Viral Infection
5 14857 ≥ 40 * Viral Infection
6 14857 ≥ 40 * Heart Disease
7 14857 ≥ 40 * Viral Infection
8 14857 ≥ 40 * Viral Infection
9 13060 3* * Cancer
10 13060 3* * Cancer
11 13060 3* * Cancer
12 13060 3* * Cancer
Table 2.3: This table is k-anonymous with k = 4 because each of the three equivalence
classes (records 1-4, 5-8, and 9-12) contain at least 4 individuals that share the same
values for all of their quasi-identifiers.
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Although a k-anonymous dataset should theoretically ensure that the highest chance of
re-identifying given record is 1k , a k-anonymous dataset does contain vulnerabilities in
terms of re-identification, of which two are described below.
I. Homogeneity attack. If all members of an equivalence class have the same
value for a given non-quasi-identifier attribute, then the value of that attribute
becomes revealed for all members of that equivalence class. For example, in the
above 4-anonymous table, all known individuals whose zip code is 13060 and are
in their 30s are revealed to have cancer [8]. This means that, if I know that my
neighbor is included in this dataset and that he lives in zip code 13060 and is in
his 30s, the value of his sensitive field, cancer, has been revealed due to the fact
that all members of his equivalence class have this value.
II. Background knowledge attack. The combination of background knowledge
with a given dataset can also lead to violation of privacy in a k-anonymous table.
In the above 4-anonymous table, imagine that one of the holders of this data
knows that his Japanese friend, whose age is below 30 and who resides in zip code
130**, exists somewhere in this dataset. Since Japanese have extremely low rates
of heart disease, then it is revealed with high probability that his friend has a
viral infection, since that is the only other condition represented in his friend’s
equivalence class [8].
Other anonymization schemes exist, like l-diversity, that address these vulnerabilities,
as discussed in the next section.
A modification to k-anonymization called (α, k)-anonymization provides further privacy
protection in datasets where a subset of values within a certain attribute are sensitive.
For example, a health dataset may contain a “condition” attribute that can take on the
value of many common diseases (i.e., flu, cold, fever), as well as a few sensitive values
(i.e., HIV or malaria) that need protection. In such a case, (α, k)-anonymity requires
the dataset to meet the standards for k-anonymization, as well as meeting an additional
requirement that, within each equivalence class, the relative frequency of any given pos-
itive sensitive value must be less than or equal to α. This acts as an upper bound for
the confidence of determining a sensitive value given the value of the quasi-identifier.
For example, the below table is (α, k)-anonymous with α = 0.5 and k = 2. We know
that k=2 because there exist at least 2 records in each equivalence class (records 1 and 2;
records 3 and 4). In order to determine the value of α, we must look at each equivalence
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class separately. Within the first equivalence class, α1 =
1
2 = 0.5 because one of the
two records is positive in its sensitive value (i.e., where the “condition” value is HIV).
Within the second equivalence class, α2 =
0
2 = 0 because neither row is positive in its
sensitive value. Therefore, overall, α = max(0, 0.5) = 0.5 and therefore α = 0.5 for the
whole dataset. Intuitively, this says that an adversary will never be more than 50%
sure, for a given equivalence class, which sensitive value in a given equivalence class is
positive [11]. Note that (α, k)-anonymization is only applicable in situations where only
a subset of values within a certain attribute is considered to be “sensitive”.
Zip Code Age Condition
1 14857 35 HIV
2 14857 35 Flu
3 13060 25 Flu
4 13060 25 Flu
Table 2.4: This table is (α, k)-anonymous with α = 0.5 and k = 2, because each
equivalence class contains at least 2 records, and within each record there is at most
a 0.5 chance of correctly guessing which record has a positive value for its sensitive
attribute, HIV.
Throughout this paper, k-anonymity will be focused upon as the primary de-identification
scheme, since it is the method of anonymization that was determined to be required by
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) law, which governs the release of
the edX dataset that will be examined in this paper.
2.3.2 l-diversity
An alternative definition of de-identification, called l-diversity, addresses the vulner-
abilities of k-anonymity by safeguarding against both homogeneity and background
knowledge attacks. This de-identification scheme requires that each equivalence class
must contain at least l distinct, well-represented values of any sensitive attribute, rather
than simply requiring a certain number of rows within each equivalence class, as k-
anonymity does.
Definition 2.7 (l-diversity). A dataset is l-diverse if each equivalence class contains at
least l “well-represented” values of any sensitive attribute [8].
“Well-represented” can be defined in multiple ways, such as requiring that a dataset
contains enough information such that any given equivalence class does not reveal too
much information about its subjects, or that the distributions of the sensitive values be
relatively even. The ability of given researchers to set their own definitions of “well-
represented” allows considerable flexibility in controlling what properties of a dataset
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determine whether it is privacy-invasive in the context of l-diversity.
The notion of l-diversity where l > 1 prevents homogeneity attacks by requiring that
records with the same quasi-identifiers not have all the same values in their sensitive
fields. Background knowledge attacks are also protected against, by requiring any ad-
versary to eliminate l− 1 other features in order to deduce which sensitive value a given
person has [8].
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition
1 1305* ≤ 40 * Heart Disease
2 1305* ≤ 40 * Viral Infection
3 1305* ≤ 40 * Cancer
4 1305* ≤ 40 * Cancer
5 1485* >40 * Viral Infection
6 1485* >40 * Heart Disease
7 1485* >40 * Viral Infection
8 1485* >40 * Viral Infection
9 1306* ≤ 40 * Heart Disease
10 1306* ≤ 40 * Viral Infection
11 1306* ≤ 40 * Cancer
12 1306* ≤ 40 * Cancer
Table 2.5: The above table is l-diverse with l = 3 because each group of individuals
who share the same quasi-identifiers have at least 3 different values corresponding to
the sensitive field, condition [8].
Extensions to l-diversity specify technical representations of what properties make a
certain value “well-represented”. One such extension is entropy l-diversity, defined as
follows.
Definition 2.8 (Entropy l-diversity). A dataset is Entropy l-diverse for a given choice
of l if each equivalence class satisfies the condition that
−
∑
s∈S
p(q∗,s) log(p(q∗,s)) ≥ log(l)
where s is equal to the sensitive attribute, where p(q∗,s) =
n(q∗,s)∑
s′∈S n(q∗,s′)
, and where n(q∗,s)
is the number of people with a given equivalence class q∗ with sensitive value s and
where S is the set of all possible values that the sensitive attribute can take.
Entropy l-diversity relies upon the concept that the entropy of a given dataset, defined
by −∑i P (xi) log(P (xi)), is an information metric for how much information is missing
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– the larger the value, the more is missing. This follows intuitively from the mathemat-
ical definition. Consider the case in which there are two possible values for xi. Then, if
P (x1) = P (x2) = 0.5, then this means we are maximally uncertain about the outcome
of xi, and we see that this corresponds to a value of entropy of 1. Similarly, we see that
entropy is minimized when we are certain about the values of x, i.e., when P (x1) = 1
and P (x2) = 0 or vice versa, which corresponds to an entropy of 0. Thus, the more
distinguishable certain records are from each other, the lower the entropy.
Entropy l-diversity therefore sets a lower limit on how much information can be encoded,
in order to ensure that every equivalence class does not reveal too much about any given
record [8].
2.3.3 Differential privacy
Perhaps the “strongest” privacy requirement is that of differential privacy, which re-
quires that the amount by which a dataset changes should be minimally affected by
whether any specific individual is included or not. Therefore, the specific data of any
given individual should never greatly affect a statistical analysis. More formally:
Definition 2.9 (-differential privacy). A randomized function κ provides -differential
privacy if, for all datasets x and x′ that differ on at most one attribute, and all S ⊂
Range(κ),
P (κ(x) ∈ S) ≤ exp() · P (κ(x′) ∈ S)
Intuitively, this requires that a function must perform similarly (i.e., multiplicatively
within a constant of exp()) on similar datasets to each other. This means that an
individual’s privacy risk should not substantially change whether they are included ver-
sus excluded in a differentially-private dataset. Differential privacy can be achieved by
adding noise to each row with a Laplacian distribution proportional to the maximum
difference between values of a single row [12].
2.4 How is de-identification achieved?
In order to transform a dataset from its original version to satisfy one of the above
definitions of privacy, one of several techniques must be employed.
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Often, the anonymization technique depends on which de-identification standard is being
used. Differential privacy, for example, uses a technique of injecting “noise” to numeric
attributes in the form of a random variable with a pre-determined mean and standard
deviation in order to de-identify data.
For k-anonymization, which will be used throughout this paper, the two most utilized
techniques are generalization and suppression. Generalization occurs when granular val-
ues are combined in order to create a broader category. This may occur for numerical
variables (i.e., combining ages 20, 21,and 22 into a broader category of 20-22) or cate-
gorical variables (i.e., generalizing location-level data from “Boston” to a more general
value, “Massachusetts”). Suppression, on the other hand, occurs when a record that
violates anonymity standards is deleted from the dataset entirely [2].
There exists a delicate tradeoff between favoring generalization versus suppression dur-
ing k-anonymization. Whereas a generalization-only de-identification approach prevents
changes in the distribution of non-quasi-identifier fields by retaining all of their values in
the dataset, the resulting values of quasi-identifiers may become generalized to a point
where few conclusions can be made about their relationship with other fields. For ex-
ample, if k-anonymity requires that the quasi-identifier “age” field in a given dataset be
generalized from integer granularity to decade granularity, correlations between age and
other characteristics would be difficult to calculate. Furthermore, since generalization is
applied to a whole column, it decreases the quality of the entire dataset by broadening
values for every record in a given dataset, whereas suppression only decreases the quality
of the dataset on a record-by-record basis by excluding a given record.
A suppression-only de-identification approach, however, skews the integrity of a dataset.
Although suppression only affects single records at a time, it alters the distribution of
attributes by eliminating records from the dataset. If values are eliminated dispropor-
tionately to the original distribution of the data, this causes statistical bias in resulting
data analyses. A balance must therefore be drawn between suppression and generaliza-
tion.
The need for this balance between suppression and generalization in a dataset is remi-
niscent of the ubiquitous bias-variance tradeoff in statistics. This concept describes the
tradeoff necessary when fitting models that are meant to generalize beyond the data
on which they are trained. If a model is fit too closely to the training data, the model
may not be generalizable to other samples due to its being overfit to the noise, rather
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than the signal, of the training data. On the other hand, if the model is too loosely fit
to the data in an attempt to be generalizable, it might miss important details in the
relationship between variables.
This concept applies to the context of de-identification, where an anonymized dataset
can be thought of as a “model” of the original dataset. If many records are suppressed,
then the anonymized dataset may lack some of the intricacies in the relationship between
variables, but if too many attributes are generalized, the variance of the conclusions that
can be made from the anonymized dataset may be too high to motivate meaningful re-
sults.
Mean-squared error (MSE) is a useful metric that enables the ideal balance between bias
and variance to be quantified. The MSE of a given model is equal to the mean value of
the difference between the model’s predicted value for a certain outcome and the actual
outcome, which can mathematically proven to be equal to the bias2 + variance of a
given model. Therefore, since minimizing MSE requires a balance between a low bias
and variance, the MSE may be a useful numeric measure of how much “error” is being
introduced into the dataset at any given point in the de-identification process. This
may be useful, for example, in order to decide whether to generalize attributes versus
suppress records during a certain step of the de-identification process.
2.5 Determination of the “best” dataset for release
During the k-anonymization process, even a single choice between row suppression and
column generalization can cascade to produce two largely different de-identified datasets
that both satisfy k-anonymity. Thus, it follows that a large number of different datasets
can satisfy the requirements for any given de-identification standard. Given that the
choice of which of these datasets to publish can have a large bearing on the analysis that
follows, is there a way to generate the dataset that is “best” for public release?
If the statistical analyses that will be performed on the dataset are known beforehand,
then the de-identification process can be executed in order to minimize the error of that
analysis. Previous literature has illustrated how alterations to de-identification schemes
can optimize for specific post-release data analyses, and are described below.
Chapter 2. Defining de-identification 15
2.5.1 Count Data
In many cases, a researcher may be concerned about preserving the marginal distribu-
tion of a single attribute. In a medical dataset, for example, preserving counts of patient
diagnoses may be important in understanding the relative frequencies of the occurrence
of certain diseases.
Count data of all non-quasi-identifier attributes can easily be maintained by only using
generalization, rather than suppression, of records. Generalization preserves count data
by nature of its not excluding any records. In the case where the counts of a quasi-
identifier attribute are desired, a generalization approach will still maintain counts ac-
curately, although with reduced granularity of the values. For example, if zip code is
generalized to city names, there will exist no ability for researchers to recover counts at
a level more granular than the city level.
Swapping of quasi-identifier values is another count-preserving method that can be
used during the k-anonymity process. This technique preserves the existence of quasi-
identifier values within the dataset, simply altering the association to other attributes.
Consider the below table, where state and gender are the two quasi-identifying fields.
The table is 1-anonymous because each equivalence class contains one record – every
record has a unique combination of values for the state and gender variables.
State Gender Condition
MA F Flu
MA M Flu
NY F Cancer
NY M Cancer
If the dataset were required to be 2-anonymous, this could be achieved via a generaliza-
tion of MA and NY into a broader category like “Eastern US”. However, this sacrifices
the granularity of knowledge about states.
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Alternatively, quasi-identifier values could be swapped in order to achieve k-anonymity.
By switching the gender of the second and third record as shown in the below right table,
this dataset can be made 2-anonymous without sacrificing the current granularity level
of the dataset nor the counts of either one of the quasi-identifier fields. Although this
swapping method preserves the granularity of quasi-identifiers, it does so at the cost of
introducing a false association between genders of the second and third rows with their
respective conditions.
State Gender Condition
MA F Flu
MA M Flu
NY F Cancer
NY M Cancer
→
State Gender Condition
MA F Flu
MA F Flu
NY M Cancer
NY M Cancer
Table 2.6: This table illustrates the de-identification of the left table from its 1-
anonymous to its 2-anonymous version by swapping quasi-identifier values between
rows, in order to preserve their frequencies. This method, however, misrepresents the
association between the swapped quasi-identifiers with their other attributes.
The above-described methods that preserve marginal distributions of single attributes
may therefore introduce inaccuracies in the joint distributions between multiple at-
tributes. For example, while the percentage of people within a dataset who have a
certain medical condition may be preserved, the relationship of the correlation of the
“medical condition” variable with demographic or lifestyle attributes may be signifi-
cantly altered, which is often more important to researchers (i.e., how many percentage
of people who have a certain condition are also smokers?).
2.5.2 Clustering
Clustering is an unsupervised learning algorithm that attempts to find a pre-specified
number of groups n, in a dataset, such that the members within each group are more
similar to each other than to members of other groups.
Fung et. al. discuss a framework in order to find the most optimal k-anonymous dataset
that preserves cluster analysis for a prespecified number of clusters, n. This algorithm
works by clustering the original, unanonymized dataset and labeling each datapoint with
its corresponding cluster assignment, and then de-identifying the dataset in a top-down
measure that preserves the original cluster assignments as much as possible with each
generalization step. This top-down method is called top-down refinement, in which re-
searchers pre-specify different levels of generalization for each distinct value in a dataset.
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For example, a researcher might pre-specify that a certain numeric attribute may be gen-
eralized into bins of size 1, 2, 5, or 10. Data is then initialized at the most masked or
generalized values (i.e., a bin size of 10), and then is iteratively refined into more specific
values until it can no longer be refined without breaking the k-anonymity requirement.
The resulting cluster analysis is empirically shown to perform 24% to 125% better than
a naively chosen k-anonymous dataset [6].
One disadvantage of this approach as it relates to clustering, however, is the inability
to know beforehand how many clusters a certain researcher will be interested in using.
To address this, Fung et al. propose the release of a different dataset for each value of
n. The risk of re-identification due to the release of multiple datasets is not discussed
in their paper.
This approach is valuable in its generalizability to almost any statistical analyses – one
promising approach to minimize modeling error introduced by de-identification is to
simply perform the statistical analysis beforehand and then de-identify the dataset in
order to minimize the error of that task at every generalization step, as was done in this
procedure.
2.5.3 Linear regression
LeFevre et. al. discuss a “greedy” mechanism that optimizes the de-identification pro-
cedure for linear regression tasks. At each step, a top-down refinement of the dataset
is performed that minimizes the following expression, where m is the number of data-
points, T is the dependent variable being modeled, and V1, ..., Vm denotes the set of data
partitions resulting from a certain candidate split:
m∑
i=1
∑
t∈Vi
(t.T − T¯ (Vi))2
We note that the above equation represents the squared difference between the linear
regression’s prediction of a given value and the true mean of that value. Therefore,
minimizing this value intuitively creates a dataset whose resulting linear regression will
have its accuracy maximized. This algorithm is repeated until no further refinements
can be made that do not violate the given anonymity requirement. Experimental results
showed that this algorithm generally led to models with lower mean absolute errors than
naive de-identification procedures, for all values of k in k-anonymization [5].
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2.5.4 Classification
Classification is a supervised learning algorithm that attempts to use characteristic fea-
tures of data points in order to predict which of two (or more) categories a specific data
point belongs to. Classification methods may, for example, be used in order to build a
predictive model for which disease a patient is likely to have, based on their demographic
attributes. De-identification procedures that are optimized for two popular classification
methods, support vector machines and logistic regression, are discussed below.
Support Vector Machines
The support vector machine (SVM) is a supervised classification algorithm that uses
labelled training data in order to determine a classification boundary that optimally di-
vides data into its two labelled classes. The accuracy of SVMs are particularly affected
by data de-identification because, if records that are near the classification boundary
become generalized or suppressed, the classification boundary becomes displaced signif-
icantly from its “true” value in the original dataset, therefore dramatically reducing the
performance of the classifier.
In addition, any non-linear SVM classifier that is trained on the original data cannot
be released to the public because the classifier itself contains information about support
vectors, the data samples that lie closest to the decision boundary [13]. To this end,
Keng-Pei Lin and Ming-Syan Chen describe the mechanisms behind a Privacy-Preserving
SVM classifier (PPSVC) that is able to accurately train the classifier without disclos-
ing sensitive personally identifying information. The PPSVC works by transforming the
sensitive attribute values of support vectors using a Taylor polynomial of linear combina-
tions of monomial feature-mapped support vectors, thereby approximating the decision
function of the SVM while maintaining a comparable level of accuracy [13]. Although
the Taylor series is an infinite series, a relatively accurate approximation can be easily
found by only using lower-order terms. Under this model, the sensitive content of any
support vector cannot be recovered without knowing the values of every other support
vector (since the coefficients of the model are a linear combination of all of the support
vectors).
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a technique that uses labelled training data in order to build a clas-
sifier that predicts the probability that a given record belongs to a certain class, given
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certain attributes about the record. For example, in a dataset that contains demographic
information of patients and whether they have the flu or not, a logistic regression might
be used in order to generate predictions of the probability that a new patient, given his
or her demographic information, will have the flu.
LeFevre et. al. develop an optimal partitioning mechanism, in which a top-down refine-
ment of data is performed that minimizes the entropy across partitions, where P is the
current tuple of quasi-identifiers, P ′ denotes the set of partitions resulting from a given
candidate split, and p(c|P ′) is the proportion of tuples in P ′ that are labeled with class
C = c, where DC is the set of possible class labels [5]:
∑
P ′
|P ′|
|P |
∑
c∈DC
−p(c|P ′) log(p(c|P ′))
Notably, the second half of this equation,
∑
c∈DC −p(c|P ′) log(p(c|P ′), is equal to the
entropy of a dataset, which can be thought of as the amount of information that is
missing from a dataset. The higher the entropy, the more information is missing from
the dataset. Therefore, the intuition behind this optimal partitioning mechanism is to
minimize the weighted entropy of data within each class, therefore maximally preserving
the amount of information within each class.
2.6 Unspecialized datasets for release
Though the above sections provide a theoretical framework for de-identifying datasets
that are predetermined to be likely used for a certain research purpose, research ob-
jectives of a given dataset are often unpredictable. Releasing multiple datasets that
are optimized for several different data analyses is problematic, because the aggregation
of all released datasets must collectively satisfy de-identification standards, which may
decrease the quality of each individual dataset.
Furthermore, especially for high-quality datasets that contain many attributes and
may be accessed publicly by many researchers, de-identification of a dataset for a pre-
determined research purpose may actually be undesirable in that the preservation of
relationships between certain variables may cause distortions in relationships between
other variables. None of the literature reviewed in the above section specifically ad-
dressed this potential effect.
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For these reasons, there are many merits for a general approach that can de-identify
datasets without optimizing for a specific statistical analysis. This paper will thus
examine the aspects of the de-identification processes that preserve general properties of
datasets, such as distributions of numeric attributes, rather than de-identifying datasets
optimized for specific data analyses.
Chapter 3
Experimental approach
3.1 Dataset description
edX is a massive online open course (MOOC) provider jointly founded by Harvard Uni-
versity and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in May 2012 that offers university-
level classes to the general public, often free of charge. A dataset containing student
records from sixteen courses on the edX platform was de-identified and released to the
public on May 30, 2014. It provides a valuable case study into the differences that are
introduced by the de-identification of a dataset.
Before release, edX data was altered in order to comply with the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). FERPA requires that personally identifiable infor-
mation be removed, as defined by fields like name, address, social security number, and
mother’s maiden name. However, it also requires that other information, alone or in
combination, must not enable identification of any student with “reasonable certainty”
(34 C.F.R. § 99.3,2013).
In order to satisfy the latter clause, the edX research team opted for a k-anonymity
framework. The value of k was chosen to be 5 due to the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion’s Privacy Technical Assistance Center which claimed that “statisticians consider a
cell size of 3 to be the absolute minimum” and that values of 5 to 10 are even safer [2].
This paper analyzes the subset of the data corresponding to HarvardX (not MITx)
courses. De-identification was performed on this HarvardX-only dataset to produce a
21
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5-anonymous version that is referred to as the “de-identified” dataset.
Attribute
Distinct values:
Original dataset
Distinct values:
De-identified dataset
Identifier Quasi-identifier
User ID 363425 312297
Course ID 5 5 Yes
Username 363412 N/A Yes
Registered 1 1
Viewed 2 2
Explored 2 2
Certified 2 2
IP 211641 N/A Yes
Country name by IP 226 N/A
Country by address 207 N/A
Level of education 14 7 Yes
Year of birth 115 79 Yes
Gender 5 4 Yes
Grade 103 103
Start time 413 413
Last event 388 388
Number of course interactions 9238 5627
Modal IP 210322 N/A
Modal IP country 226 N/A
Final country 229 22 Yes
Final country source 4 N/A
Number of active days 182 135
Number of video plays 3322 2045
Number of chapters 35 35
Number of forum posts 183 8 Yes
Roles 1 1
Table 3.1: Description of original and de-identified datasets containing only HarvardX
courses.
The dataset that was studied contained 26 attributes that contain information on the
demographics, activity levels, and performance levels for each student-course combina-
tion included in the dataset. The quasi-identifiers are considered to be course ID, level of
education, year of birth, gender, country, and the number of forum posts. The number
of forum posts is considered to be a quasi-identifier because the forum was a publicly
accessible website that could be scraped in order to link user IDs with their number
of forum posts. Course ID was also considered to be a quasi-identifier because unique
combinations of courses could conceivably provide a link between personally identifiable
information that a student posts in a forum with the edX dataset.
3.2 De-identification procedure for edX dataset
De-identification of the edX dataset was achieved via a Python script written by Jon
Daries, a senior research analyst at MIT Institutional Research [14]. It is written in or-
der to allow the user to control the degree of generalization, suppression, and numerical
binning that is performed, as well as allowing different values of k for k-anonymization
Chapter 3. Experimental approach 23
to be set.
At a high level, the algorithm works by loading in two versions of a SQLite database
containing the original data – one that will be modified by the de-identification process
and the other of which is preserved for comparison with the de-identified dataset. The
first database is then sanitized by removing sensitive data such as timestamps, and then
relevant attributes are generalized, suppressed, trimmed, and binned. Finally, records
that violate k-anonymity after these four steps become suppressed in order to result in
the final k-anonymous dataset [14].
This algorithm, based on Latanya Sweeney’s Datafly algorithm, with implementation
specific to the edX dataset, is characterized by its use of bottom-up generalization rather
than top-down specialization, meaning that discrete values start at their original values
and are generalized to broader values as necessitated by the k-anonymization. Further-
more, Datafly is greedy in that each step is chosen in terms of the most locally (rather
than globally) optimal step [15].
Below is a detailed outline of the algorithm used to de-identify the edX dataset.
I. Define environment variables.
The user assigns string values to the following variables:
• file, the original non-de-identified dataset filename
• table, the name for the SQLite database that will be modified
• userVar, the column name of the user ID attribute
• courseVar, the column name of the course ID attribute
• countryVar, the column name of the country name attribute
• k, the level of k-anonymity that is required
II. Load data into SQLite database.
The original data is loaded in twice as two separate SQLite databases: the first
will ultimately undergo the de-identification procedure, and the second will serve
as an unaltered database that will be used for comparisons with the de-identified
dataset at the end.
III. The original dataset undergoes basic sanitation.
A. Anonymized versions of potentially identifying variables are created.
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i. The timestamp of the date of course registration and the date of the last
interaction with the course are removed, leaving only a date in the form
of YYYY-MM-DD).
ii. New attributes are created that correspond to the full country name and
full region name (i.e., “India” and “Other South Asia”) to which each
record’s country code corresponds.
B. Indexes are created on the courseVar and userVar variables to optimize
searches and queries on these columns. (Users cannot see these indices, how-
ever.)
C. All staff and instructors are deleted from the table.
D. Anonymous user IDs are generated, which take the form of “MHxPC13” +
random number, where the random number is generated using a salted hash
of the username (i.e., a hash of the username concatenated with a random
number, which makes it harder for the hash to be reversed). The choice
of “MHxPC13” is a shortened version of “MITx/HarvardX Person-Course
AY2013”.
IV. Calculate entropy.
A. Create a new attribute called entropy that contains concatenated versions
of the values of every column.
B. The entropy of the dataset is then calculated. If the set of unique con-
catenated values is viewed as a random variable X with possible values
{x1, ..., xn}, and if the probability mass function P (xi) is defined as the num-
ber of times that the data takes on the value of xi over the total number of
rows there are in the data, then entropy is defined as:
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
P (xi) log2[P (xi)]
C. The variables that are indicative of course performance (viewed, explored,
certified, grade, nevents, ndays act,nplay video, nchapters, nforum posts)
are loaded into the utilVars variable and then passed through the utilMatrix
function in order to calculate the entropy, mean, and standard of these vari-
ables. This allows a record to be kept of how much these course performance
variables change throughout the de-identification process.
V. Generalize and drop variables as needed.
A. Every unique course combination is found. Users who have taken a course
combination whose value is taken by less than k−1 other users then must have
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a given number of courses dropped until their course combination is no longer
unique. Users with course combinations that cannot be made non-unique by
this method are dropped from the dataset.
B. For rows whose “country” values are represented less than k times, replace
the “country” with the “continent” value.
VI. Check for k-anonymity.
At this point, the program prompts the user for the indices of the quasi-identifying
(QI) variables and then reports how many rows do not satisfy k-anonymity given
those QI fields. The program also checks k-anonymity for rows that contain null
values by checking whether the unique combinations of the non-null values of the
QI variables satisfied k-anonymity.
VII. Data trimming and binning.
A. The tailFinder function is then applied to the two numeric quasi-identifier
fields: nforum posts and YoB (year of birth). The tailFinder function cuts
off user-specified values on the low or high ends of the values for a given
column. This can be helpful for eliminating unrealistic values (i.e., birth
years before 1900), values that are clearly too identifying (i.e., forum posts
above 200), or simply trimming the range of values down to an evenly-divisible
number, which makes binning numbers into integer-sized buckets more cleanly
performed.
B. After cutting the tails, the values for these variables are binned into a user-
specified number of bins and then the kAnonWrap function is used to check
for k-anonymity and to return the proportion of rows required in order for
the dataset to be k-anonymous.
VIII. Data suppression check.
Finally, after data trimming and binning, each record’s QI attributes are concate-
nated in order to form a QI key. Rows whose QI key are represented less than
k times are dropped from the dataset in order to generate the final, de-identified
dataset.
IX. Comparison between original and de-identified datasets.
After the de-identified dataset has been generated, basic statistics regarding the
total counts and averages of demographic and course performance attributes are
reported, for both the original and de-identified datasets, as a simple measure of
the bias introduced by the de-identification process [14].
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3.3 edX data: de-identified versus original dataset
Here we investigate the differences between the original edX data and the k-anonymized
data that were introduced during the de-identification algorithm described above. By
FERPA requirements, k was set to 5, meaning that there can exist no student record
that is indistinguishable from less than 4 other student records in terms of its quasi-
identifying fields: course ID, gender, year of birth, country, level of education, and
number of forum posts [16].
The de-identification process decreased the number of records in the dataset from 440853
to 340354, a 22.8% reduction. Here we investigate in more detail how the characteristics
of several attributes were changed between the original and de-identified dataset.
3.4 One-dimensional changes: count data
During the process of k-anonymization, the generalization and suppression of records
leads to changes in the summary statistics of attributes. In the edX dataset, the count
data of demographic and enrollment information changed as depicted in the tables below
as a result of the de-identification process:
Original De-identified % Decrease
CB22x,S13 45577 30002 34.2%
CS50x,12 193495 169621 12.3%
ER22x,S13 81378 57406 29.4%
PH207x,F12 66145 41592 37.1%
PH278x,S13 54258 39602 27.0%
Figure 3.1: Changes in the enrollment of each class caused by the de-identification
procedure.
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Original De-identified % Decrease
Male 0.60 0.62 -3.33%
Viewed 0.57 0.57 0%
Explored 0.80 0.60 25%
Certified 0.40 0.20 50%
Table 3.2: Changes in performance and gender variables caused by the de-
identification procedure.
We also note that the distribution of numeric attributes changes between the original and
the de-identified datasets. Here, we calculate the chi-squared distance between attributes
in the original versus the de-identified datasets. This metric measures the “distance”
between the distributions of two variables, as defined by the following equation, where
orig and anon are two vectors containing normalized counts of binned values of a given
attribute in the original and de-identified datasets:
d(orig, anon) =
n∑
i=1
(origi − anoni)2
2(origi + anoni)
Intuitively, this equation measures how much larger the observed differences between
the distribution of data between the original and anonymized datasets (the numerator)
are from the sum of the values across the data (the denominator). A larger value of the
chi-squared distance indicates a larger difference between the two distributions of data.
Attribute Bin size Chi-squared distance
Number of video plays 1 0.034
Number of forum posts 1 0.020
Number of active days 1 0.0083
Number of chapters accessed 1 0.0080
Year of Birth 1 0.0064
Grade 0.01 0.0016
Table 3.3: Difference in the distribution of attributes between the original and
anonymized datasets, as measured by chi-squared distance. A higher value indicates a
larger difference between the two distributions of data.
This table reveals that the largest differences between the original and de-identified
datasets are found in the number of forum posts and the number of video plays, both
of which are attributes measuring student activity. This suggests that the de-identified
dataset tended to be skewed in its representation of how active students were.
Chapter 3. Experimental approach 28
The histograms on the next page visually characterize the differences between the orig-
inal and de-identified datasets. Again, we observe the largest difference between the
original and de-identified distributions of the number of forum posts, due to the sup-
pression of rare values of forum posts during the k-anonymization process. We also
generally see that other attributes measuring course activity (i.e., number of chapters
accessed, number of active days, and number of video plays) appear to have their high
values underrepresented in the de-identified dataset, likely also induced by the suppres-
sion of rows corresponding to more active students.
Chapter 3. Experimental approach 29
Figure 3.2: Histograms describing the differences between the original and de-
identified dataset. The blue bars represent the frequency of values in the original
dataset, whereas the red bars represent the frequency of values in the de-identified
dataset. Most notably, the de-identified dataset often does not contain values in the
tail ends of many activity variables, such as the number of forum posts and the number
of active days, likely induced by the suppression of rows during the k-anonymization
process.
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3.5 Two-dimensional changes: correlation data
Correlation is a measure of the degree to which two variables have a linear relationship.
A measure of 1 indicates a total positive linear relationship, -1 indicates a total negative
linear relationship, and 0 indicates no linear relationship. Mathematically, correlation
is defined as below.
Definition 3.1 (Correlation). The correlation between two variables, X and Y , is given
by the covariance of the variables divided by the product of their standard deviations:
Correlation(X,Y ) =
E[(X − µX)(Y − µY )]
σxσy
Pairwise correlations between numeric attributes of the original and de-identified datasets
are reported below:
viewed explored certified grade ndays act nplay video nchapters nforum posts
viewed 1.000 0.250 0.163 0.195 0.242 0.074 0.413 0.046
explored 0.250 1.000 0.619 0.681 0.637 0.241 0.789 0.130
certified 0.163 0.619 1.000 0.940 0.658 0.251 0.642 0.156
grade 0.195 0.681 0.940 1.000 0.721 0.303 0.692 0.163
ndays act 0.242 0.637 0.658 0.721 1.000 0.371 0.673 0.243
nplay video 0.074 0.241 0.251 0.303 0.371 1.000 0.175 0.088
nchapters 0.413 0.789 0.642 0.692 0.673 0.175 1.000 0.163
nforum posts 0.046 0.130 0.156 0.163 0.243 0.088 0.163 1.000
Table 3.4: The pairwise correlations for the original dataset between numeric at-
tributes.
viewed explored certified grade ndays act nplay video nchapters nforum posts
viewed 1.000 0.223 0.126 0.154 0.218 0.077 0.426 0.054
explored 0.223 1.000 0.518 0.574 0.552 0.243 0.765 0.034
certified 0.126 0.518 1.000 0.939 0.571 0.264 0.584 0.037
grade 0.154 0.574 0.939 1.000 0.634 0.322 0.626 0.044
ndays act 0.218 0.552 0.571 0.634 1.000 0.419 0.616 0.057
nplay video 0.077 0.243 0.264 0.322 0.419 1.000 0.200 0.003
nchapters 0.426 0.765 0.584 0.626 0.616 0.200 1.000 0.090
nforum posts 0.054 0.034 0.037 0.044 0.057 0.003 0.090 1.000
Table 3.5: The pairwise correlations for the anonymized dataset between numeric
attributes.
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Figure 3.3: Matrix representing the change in correlation of numeric variables be-
tween the original and de-identified datasets.
The above figure shows the changes in correlation between the original and de-identified
datasets. The largest differences between correlations in the original versus de-identified
datasets occur in the rightmost column between the number of forum posts with other
attributes.
The large changes in these correlations are likely caused by the fact that the number
of forum posts is a quasi-identifier, meaning that uncommon values (which in this case
corresponded to larger values) of this attribute correspond to records that must be sup-
pressed. The suppression of records in the original dataset who posted very frequently
on the forum (including one record with more than 3,500 forum posts!) but who had
moderate levels of activity or performance therefore caused an increase in correlation of
the de-identified dataset as compared with the original dataset.
There did exist other large changes in correlation, however, that were not necessarily as-
sociated with the elimination of outliers. For example, the correlation between grade and
whether someone had accessed at least half of the chapters (“explored”) had a change of
0.11, despite both variables being bounded between 0 and 1. Similarly, the correlation
between whether someone became certified and whether someone had accessed at least
half of the chapters (“explored”) experienced a correlation change of 0.10, despite both
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variables also only taking on values of either 0 or 1. Therefore, relationships between
other course activity variables were affected by de-identification, as well.
Chapter 4
k-anonymization: identifying
sources of bias
In order to better understand how the k-anonymization process creates undesirable dif-
ferences between the original and de-identified datasets, we here focus on understanding
the mechanisms that cause uneven suppression of records. As discussed in the previous
chapter, the uniqueness of each record’s combination of quasi-identifier values deter-
mines its likelihood of requiring suppression or generalization under a k-anonymization
framework. The below section will further investigate this idea in order to determine
how properties of quasi-identifiers within a dataset influence which records become gen-
eralized or suppressed.
4.1 The relationship between quasi-identifier frequency and
the bias of attributes
During the de-identification process, the rarity of each record’s combination of quasi-
identifier attributes determines the likelihood of that record becoming suppressed or
generalized. Therefore, in order to understand the mechanisms by which bias is in-
troduced into a de-identified dataset, we first aim to understand how quasi-identifier
combinations affect the skewness of the data created by the de-identification process.
We begin by investigating how the frequency of each quasi-identifier field in isolation
maps onto non-sensitive column values like grade, performance variables, and activity
variables. Intuitively, we hypothesize that highly negative correlations between the
frequency of a given quasi-identifier value with other numeric attributes will generate
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the most highly biased numeric variables in the de-identified dataset. For example, if rare
values of a given quasi-identifier tend to be associated with high grades, de-identification
would likely skew grades downward due to the suppression of records with high grades.
4.1.1 Individual quasi-identifier frequencies
Quasi-identifier frequencies versus grade
Of the six quasi-identifier fields, the number of forum posts has the strongest relationship
between the frequency of its values with their corresponding mean grade. The negative
sign of the correlation signals that, since rarer values of the number of forum posts tend
to be associated with higher grades, the k-anonymization process is likely to skew grades
downward by virtue of its suppression of records that correspond to rarer quasi-identifier
combinations.
The rarity of a given user’s course combination also appears to have a fairly strong
negative correlation with mean grade, signaling that the exclusion of records based on
this criteria may similarly tend to skew grades towards lower achievers.
Interestingly, all six of the quasi-identifier fields show some degree of negative corre-
lations between the frequency of the quasi-identifier value with grade, implying that
k-anonymization would likely create a downward skew in grades. All graphs (on the
next page) demonstrate the relationship between the frequency of quasi-identifier values
versus the mean grade, and are shown for k=1, the original dataset.
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Correlation: -0.4283; p-value: < 1e-15 Correlation: -0.1698; p-value: < 1e-15
Correlation: -0.0512; p-value: < 1e-15 Correlation: -0.0452; p-value: < 1e-15
Correlation: -0.0447; p-value: < 1e-15 Correlation: -0.0228; p-value: < 1e-15
Figure 4.1: Here we explore the relationships between the frequency of each of the
six quasi-identifier attributes with the corresponding mean grade for that value. Both
visually and numerically, the strongest relationship clearly exists between the frequency
of forum post values with the mean grade of those records.
Quasi-identifier frequencies versus performance variables
The number of forum posts is again the quasi-identifier variable with the clearest rela-
tionship between the frequency of the occurrence of its values with performance variables.
From the fairly high negative correlations, we deduce that rarer values of the number
of forum posts tend to be associated with people who view, explore, and are certified
by the course. Therefore, this suggests that the k-anonymization process is likely to
skew performance metrics downward, since these “rarer” values of the number of forum
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posts are more likely to distinguish a given record in terms of its combination of quasi-
identifier values.
The strong negative correlations between the frequency of the number of forum posts and
the percent of students who viewed, explored, or were certified in a course is explained
by the fact that most students post a low number of times (40 times more students
posted 0 times than 1 time!), and it is precisely these inactive students who are most
likely to not have viewed, explored, or been certified in a course. Similarly, people who
post multiple times (which represent less frequently represented values of the number of
forum posts) are the most likely to have viewed, explored, or been certified in a course.
Thus, this results in a fairly strong negative relationship between the frequency of the
value of the number of forum posts with certain performance metrics.
We also note that, as before, the vast majority of correlations between the frequency of
quasi-identifier values and performance variables in the original dataset are negative, as
shown in the table below. Again, this suggests that anonymization is likely to skew the
performance metrics downward by removing more uncommon values of quasi-identifier
fields that tend to be associated with higher performance values.
Correlations(QI freq, performance)
QI var Performance var Correlation p-value
Number of forum posts
Viewed -0.2122 < 1e-15
Explored -0.3498 < 1e-15
Certified -0.3878 < 1e-15
Year of birth
Viewed -0.0502 < 1e-15
Explored -0.0476 < 1e-15
Certified -0.0441 < 1e-15
Education
Viewed -0.0317 < 1e-15
Explored -0.0291 < 1e-15
Certified -0.0208 < 1e-15
Country
Viewed -0.0017* 0.3828
Explored -0.0469 < 1e-15
Certified -0.0420 < 1e-15
Course combinations
Viewed 0.0475 < 1e-15
Explored -0.0849 < 1e-15
Certified -0.1414 < 1e-15
Gender
Viewed 0.0304 < 1e-15
Explored 0.0009* 0.581
Certified -0.0334 < 1e-15
Table 4.1: The numeric values of the correlation of quasi-identifier frequencies with
various performance metrics in the original dataset. Correlation values that are marked
with an asterisk are not significant at the α = 0.05 level.
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Figure 4.2: These graphs show the relationship between the frequency of each of the
six quasi-identifier attributes with the mean percentage of students who viewed the
courseware tab, accessed at least half the chapters (“explored”) or earned a certificate
in the course. Again, the strongest relationship occurs between the frequency of forum
posts with each of these values.
Quasi-identifier frequencies versus activity variables
As we have seen above with the grade and performance variables, the number of forum
posts again has the strongest association between its frequency of occurrence with ac-
tivity variables, such as the number of chapters accessed, the number of active days on
edX, the number of interactions (events) with the site, and the number of times videos
were played. This follows the same intuition as above – the most frequently occurring
value for the number of forum posts is 0, which is precisely the population of students
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who are most likely to have not been active in a course. We also see a fairly strong neg-
ative correlation between these activity measures with two other quasi-identifier fields:
frequency of course combinations and year of birth.
As before, the negative sign of all of these correlations suggests that the records that
are most likely to be dropped during the k-anonymization process correspond to users
with high activity levels. Therefore, the activity levels in the anonymized datasets are
likely to be biased downward.
Correlations(QI freq, activity)
QI var Activity var Correlation p-value
Number of forum posts
# Chapters -0.4264 < 1e-15
# Active Days -0.4736 < 1e-15
# Events -0.4124 < 1e-15
# Video Plays -0.2580 < 1e-15
Course combinations
# Chapters -0.2601 < 1e-15
# Active Days -0.1152 < 1e-15
# Events -0.1358 < 1e-15
# Video Plays -0.0171 0.000259
Year of birth
# Chapters -0.0825 < 1e-15
# Active Days -0.1014 < 1e-15
# Events -0.0713 < 1e-15
# Video Plays -0.0607 < 1e-15
Country
# Chapters -0.0457 < 1e-15
# Active Days -0.0318 < 1e-15
# Events -0.0407 < 1e-15
# Video Plays -0.0399 < 1e-15
Gender
# Chapters -0.0460 < 1e-15
# Active Days -0.0248 < 1e-15
# Events -0.0539 < 1e-15
# Video Plays -0.0093* 0.051
Education
# Chapters -0.0313 < 1e-15
# Active Days -0.0296 < 1e-15
# Events -0.0287 < 1e-15
# Video Plays -0.0329 < 1.9e-12
Table 4.2: The numeric values of the correlation of quasi-identifier frequencies with
various activity metrics. Correlation values that are marked with an asterisk are not
significant at the α = 0.05 level.
Chapter 4. k-anonymization: identifying sources of bias 39
Figure 4.3: These graphs show the relationship between the frequency of each of the
six quasi-identifier attributes with various activity metrics. As with the other numeric
attributes, the strongest relationship again occurs between the frequency of forum posts
with each of these values.
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4.1.2 Quasi-identifier combination frequencies
Above, we observed a relationship between most quasi-identifier variables with grade,
performance, and activity variables, which suggested that the k-anonymization process
may ultimately bias the dataset towards lower performers due to the fact that rarer
values of these quasi-identifiers tend to be associated with higher values. Here, we ana-
lyze whether the rarity of the combination of all six quasi-identifiers also has this same
negative correlation with grade, performance, and activity variables.
Quasi-identifier combination frequencies versus grade
Below we observe a fairly strong relationship between the frequency of the combination of
six quasi-identifiers with the mean grade for each value. The correlation between quasi-
identifier frequency and mean grade is significant and has a value of -0.3419, signaling
that more frequent quasi-identifier values tend to be associated with lower grades. In
conjunction with our earlier finding that each of the individual quasi-identifier values
was also individually negatively correlated with grade, this further suggests that k-
anonymization will create a negative bias in the reported grades.
Figure 4.4: The relationship between the frequency of quasi-identifier combinations
with the mean grade. The correlation of this relationship is -0.3419 with a p-value of
1.043e-09.
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Quasi-identifier combination frequencies versus performance
Although we observe no significant relationship between the frequency of quasi-identifier
combinations with the percentage of students who view the “courseware” tab, there does
exist a negative relationship between the frequency of quasi-identifier values with the
percentage of students who access at least half the chapters (“explored”), as well as
with who ultimately get certified. As before, the negative sign of these correlations
between quasi-identifier frequency with the “explored” and “certified” values suggest
that the k-anonymized dataset is likely to have lower performance metrics than the
original dataset.
Correlations(QI freq, performance)
Perf Correlation p-value
Viewed 0.0375* 0.5159
Explored -0.1129 0.0500
Certified -0.3121 3.027e-08
Figure 4.5: Relationship between the frequency of the combination of all quasi-
identifier values with performance variables. Note that the relationship with the
“viewed” variable is not statistically significant.
Quasi-identifier combination frequencies versus activity
We similarly find a negative relationship between the frequency of quasi-identifier com-
binations with measures of course activity. Although the relationship between quasi-
identifier frequency with the number of active days is insignificant at the α = 0.05 level,
the relationship between the other activity levels are all fairly strongly negative. As was
also seen between the individual quasi-identifier variables’ correlation with measures of
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activity, this suggests that the de-identification process is likely to skew these variables
downward.
Correlations(QI freq, activity)
Activity Correlation p-value
# Chapters -0.3358 2.272e-09
# Active Days -0.1239* 0.05951
# Events -0.3651 1.008e-08
# Video Plays -0.2585 0.005289
Figure 4.6: Relationship between the frequency of the combination of all quasi-
identifier values with activity variables. Note that the correlation with the number
of active days is insignificant at the α = 0.05 level.
4.2 Measures of data utility
In order to test the hypothesis that strong correlations between the frequency of quasi-
identifier attributes with the values of non-identifier fields creates a skew in the data,
there must be some pre-determined notions of skewness or, more generally, the “utility”
of a dataset. Literature that was reviewed in Chapter 2 often defined the “utility” of a
dataset in terms of the error of a specific statistical procedure, such as linear regression
or classification, and attempted to minimize this error metric during the de-identification
process. However, as discussed previously, using this notion of utility can often be prob-
lematic in situations where the desired statistical analysis is not known in advance.
For this reason, we opt to use general measures of utility that either measure the change
in spread of the data, or that measure the degree to which a given dataset has been
“anonymized”. Specifically, four measures of utility are studied:
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Definition 4.1 (Discernibility metric). This metric penalizes every record proportion-
ally to the number of records that are indistinguishable from it. Intuitively, this captures
the desire to be able to distinguish between records – the more indistinguishable that
records are from each other, the higher degree that the de-identification “blurred” records
together. The discernibility metric is formally defined on a pre-suppression de-identified
dataset D as follows:
CDM (D, k) =
∑
E∈|E|≥k
|E|2 +
∑
E∈|E|<k
|D||E|
where |D| is the size of the original dataset and the sets E are the equivalence class
induced by the k-anonymization [17].
The first term in this metric penalizes the equivalence classes that are present in the
de-identified dataset by the size of their equivalence classes, while the second term pe-
nalizes the suppressed records by the size of the original dataset, due to the fact that
their suppression makes them “indistinguishable” from every record in the dataset [17].
Note that this calculation must be performed before records are suppressed, or else there
would never be any records belonging to the |E| ≥ k set. After the calculation of this
metric, the necessary rows can then be suppressed.
Definition 4.2 (Average equivalence class size). This is the average size of the equiv-
alence classes that are present in the de-identified dataset. If E denotes the set of
equivalence classes in the de-identified dataset, E1, ..., En, then the average equivalence
class is simply calculated as:
∑
i |Ei|
|E|
Average equivalence class size is very closely related to the above-defined discernibility
metric, except that it does not penalize for suppressed rows [18].
Definition 4.3 (Entropy). Entropy is a measure of how much information is missing
from a dataset. Mathematically, it is defined as:
H(E) = −
∑
i
|Ei|
N
log2(
|Ei|
N
)
where |Ei| is the size of the ith equivalence class, and where N is the total number
of rows in the dataset. |Ei|N can be thought of as the probability of a certain record’s
membership to a given equivalence class.
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Intuitively, entropy can be thought of as the degree to which the information in a dataset
identifies a given record. If each record is easily distinguished from every other record,
then the |Ei|N values will be low and the entropy will be low. However, if many records
are indistinguishable from each other, then entropy will be high. This can be a very
valuable metric in terms of measuring data quality [10].
Definition 4.4 (Q-diversity). Given a dataset D and its de-identified version A, Q-
diversity is a metric of the “distance” between its discretized values and its original
values, formally defined as:
qd(Aa) =
S(Aa)
|Da|
where S(Aa) is a function whose value denotes the number of values of quasi-identifier
“a” are present in a given dataset [19].
Given this notion of distance between original and discretized values, an overall notion
of utility can then be created, such that:
Q-Diversity = avg(qd(v1), ..., qd(vn))
for each QI, 1 through n.
Intuitively, Q-diversity measures the degree to which discretization of values has blurred
the dataset. Unlike the previous three measures of utility, however, lower values signal
a worse quality dataset [19]. Note that Q-diversity ranges between 0 and 1, with 1
signaling that no discretization has occurred. Since the other three notions of utility are
encoded such that higher values are worse, we will report the metric of 1 -(Q-diversity)
so that comparisons can more easily be made between the four metrics.
Of the four above-outlined notions of utility, average equivalence class size and the dis-
cernibility metric are based on the size of equivalence classes, and therefore are measures
of how distinguishable records are based on their quasi-identifiers. Average equivalence
class size does not take suppressed rows into account, so is a good measure of the ef-
fect of generalization on the size of equivalence classes, whereas the discernibility metric
measures the effect of both suppression and generalization. Due to the similarity of these
metrics, they are likely to be highly correlated. Although entropy also depends on the
size of equivalence classes, it moreso measures the balance between sizes rather than the
sum or mean of the sizes, and therefore measures a different aspect of the dataset than
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the other metrics. Finally, Q-diversity measures the degree of generalization of values,
so is unlikely to be directly correlated with any of the above metrics.
With these measures of utility, we are now able to quantify the effect that various factors
have on a given dataset, in addition to looking at simple numeric qualities like changes
in mean and standard deviation of numeric attributes. Using these tools, we proceed to
analyze the effect of various factors on dataset quality.
Specifically, given our hypothesis that the unequal distribution of quasi-identifiers is
one of the driving factors of bias and loss of utility in datasets throughout the de-
identification process, then we should expect a change in dataset utility when:
• k is increased. In this case, the quasi-identifier frequency threshold for dropping
a given record becomes higher and therefore, if there exists a correlation between
quasi-identifier combination frequency and the mean values of performance vari-
ables, then an increase in k should correspond with a loss of utility and an increase
in bias.
• Quasi-identifier variables are eliminated. If a single quasi-identifier’s fre-
quency is highly correlated with a given numeric attribute, then simply dropping
the entire quasi-identifier variable should lower the correlation between combina-
tions of quasi-identifiers and therefore lessen the bias introduced into the dataset
through the de-identification process.
• Correlation between quasi-identifier rarity with numeric attributes is
altered. In order to support our hypothesis that a high correlation between
quasi-identifier frequency and numeric attributes causes skewing of de-identified
datasets, we expect that, if the correlation of a certain quasi-identifier variable’s
frequency were to be increased with a given numeric attribute, the skewness of
that attribute would likewise increase (and the utility would decrease).
In the following sections, we analyze the outcomes of these three experiments in order
to test the hypothesis that the unequal distribution of quasi-identifier frequencies may
introduce skewness into the dataset.
4.3 The effect of k on statistical bias and utility
The choice of k in a k-anonymization framework is a large determinant of the degree
of utility loss and gain in bias that is introduced by the anonymization process. Recall
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that, in a k-anonymous dataset, any single record must be indistinguishable from at
least k-1 distinct individuals in terms of the quasi-identifier fields. For example, in a
dataset with “State of Residence” as the single quasi-identifier field, any record belong-
ing to a state with less than k residents must have its value either removed from the
dataset or “generalized” to a broader category that contained more than k residents,
such as “Midwestern US”. Accordingly, greater values of k provide stricter anonymiza-
tion requirements, because each record is required to be indistinguishable from a greater
number of other records, meaning that more suppression and generalization will be re-
quired.
Furthermore, legal restrictions on de-identification, and specifically the value of k (or
equivalent values in other anonymization schemes), are often open to interpretation.
Significant debate among legal specialists was necessary when interpreting the level of
anonymization that FERPA laws required of the edX dataset. Even though the final
determination was to use a value of k = 5, there was considerable discussion whether k
may have only been required to be 3.
To investigate the extent of the effect of the choice of k on the datasets, we first ran
the k-anonymization procedure on the original dataset for seven different values of k.
Summary statistics on the changes induced by different values of k are shown below
– it can be seen that larger values of k correspond to smaller de-identified datasets.
Furthermore, gender and activity metrics become increasingly skewed from the original
dataset’s values as k increases.
Original k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7 k=8
Number of records 419174 375358 363154 353066 344066 336032 329088
% Male 60.0% 61.0% 61.2% 61.4% 61.5% 61.7% 61.8%
% Viewed 60.0% 58.1% 57.8% 57.5% 57.5% 57.4% 57.4%
% Explored 8.6% 6.7% 6.5% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2% 6.1%
% Certified 3.8% 2.4% 2.2% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9%
Table 4.3: Table of summary statistics describing changes in the data as the original
dataset is de-identified with different values of k. As k increases, the resulting de-
identified dataset becomes smaller and more skewed.
Given a k-anonymity framework for de-identification, the existence of a correlation be-
tween the frequency of quasi-identifier values with numeric attributes should intuitively
drive a relationship between k and loss of data utility. As the value of k increases, grades
associated with increasingly “less rare” grades become subject to suppression and gen-
eralization. In the presence of a correlation between the rarity of a grade with numeric
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Figure 4.7: Change in course enrollments for different values of k in k-anonymization.
attributes, this suggests that numeric attributes may become more skewed upward or
downward, depending on the sign of the correlation.
Not surprisingly, we observe that as k increases (and thus as the anonymity requirement
becomes stricter, requiring each record to be less and less unique), the mean grade, the
mean performance, and the mean activity level all decrease, as was predicted in the
previous section by the analysis of the rarity of certain quasi-identifier values versus the
grade, performance, and activity metrics.
Not only are the means of certain numerical attributes skewed downward by an increasing
value of k, but so is the utility of the entire dataset, in terms of each of the four utility
measures that were defined above, as is seen in the below table.
k DM Avg(| EqCl |) Entropy 1-Qdiv
k=1 7.83 x 107 4.27 51.6 0
k=3 1.85 x 1010 19.0 159 0.473
k=4 2.36 x 1010 23.1 183 0.473
k=5 2.78 x 1010 26.8 202 0.479
k=6 3.16 x 1010 30.2 219 0.480
k=7 3.5 x 1010 32.7 230 0.474
k=8 3.79 x 1010 35.8 243 0.479
Table 4.4: As k increases, there is a loss of data utility in terms of every utility metric,
signaling a decrease in data utility as the data must comply to stricter de-identification
requirements.
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Figure 4.8: As k increases in a k-anonymity framework, we observe a decrease in
the mean grade, performance, and activity levels, likely due to the association between
rarer quasi-identifier values with higher values of these variables.
As k increases, we therefore have seen that bias is introduced into the dataset and utility
is decreased. This observation is in accordance with our hypothesis that the correlation
of quasi-identifier frequencies with numeric attributes may contribute to the bias and
decreased utility of datasets. To further explore this hypothesis, we will also explore the
relationship between the correlation of quasi-identifier characteristics and other effects
it may have on the resulting de-identified dataset.
4.4 The effect of suppressing entire quasi-identifier columns
on statistical bias
Under the hypothesis that a high correlation between the frequency of quasi-identifier
attributes with numeric attributes is the cause of skewness during the de-identification
process, we would expect that the complete omission of a quasi-identifier column whose
values are highly correlated with a numeric attribute would reduce the bias of that at-
tribute. Below, we perform k-anonymization on the original dataset, using only 5 of
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the 6 QI fields at once, in order to observe the effect of omitting a given QI field on
the skewness of certain numeric attributes in a dataset. Intuitively, we expect that, the
higher the absolute value of correlation between the rarity of the values of the removed
column with a given attribute, the less skewed the overall dataset will be in terms of
that numeric attribute.
The tables below compare the correlation between the QI frequency and grade, per-
formance, and activity metrics, as compared with the resulting mean of these columns
when a given QI attribute is omitted. We find that, when the number of forum posts
(which has the highest absolute value of correlation with each of the numeric attributes)
is deleted as a quasi-identifier attribute, the resulting mean of every column except the
number of chapters is the highest. This fits with our hypothesis: since records with high
values are no longer being suppressed due to their unique number of forum posts, the
mean of associated performance and activity metrics becomes higher in the de-identified
dataset. However, the relationship between the removal of the other quasi-identifier
variables with the mean grade of the dataset does not appear to relate to the correlation
of the frequency of the QI with grade.
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QI removed Cor(QI freq,grade) Grade
None-Original NA 0.045
None-Deidentified NA 0.037
Forum posts -0.43 0.061
Course combo -0.17 0.024
Country -0.051 0.037
Year of birth -0.045 0.043
Gender -0.045 0.029
Education -0.023 0.039
QI removed Cor(QI
freq,
viewed)
Viewed Cor(QI
freq,
explored)
Explored Cor(QI
freq,
certified)
Certified
None-Original NA 0.60 NA 0.086 NA 0.038
None-Deidentified NA 0.58 NA 0.062 NA 0.020
Forum posts -0.21 0.60 -0.35 0.084 -0.39 0.037
Course combo 0.048 0.43 -0.085 0.066 -0.14 0.018
Country -0.050 0.59 -0.047 0.076 -0.042 0.031
Year of birth -0.0017 0.59 -0.048 0.080 -0.044 0.034
Gender 0.030 0.58 0.00090 0.066 -0.033 0.024
Education -0.032 0.58 -0.029 0.068 -0.021 0.025
QI removed Cor(QI
freq,
days)
# Active
days
Cor(QI
freq,
chapters)
# Chapters
None-Original NA 7.0 NA 4.4
None-Deidentified NA 4.9 NA 3.5
Forum posts -0.47 6.8 -0.43 4.3
Course combo -0.12 5.1 -0.2601 4.8
Country -0.032 6.1 -0.046 4.1
Year of birth -0.10 6.5 -0.083 4.2
Gender -0.025 5.3 -0.046 3.7
Education -0.030 5.5 -0.031 3.8
QI removed Cor(QI
freq,
events)
# Events Cor(QI
freq,
vid plays)
# Video Plays
None-Original NA 489 NA 302
None-Deidentified NA 240 NA 151
Forum posts -0.41 470 -0.26 300
Course combo -0.14 204 -0.0171 86
Country -0.041 396 -0.040 258
Year of birth -0.071 436 -0.061 278
Gender -0.054 290 -0.0093 191
Education -0.029 305 -0.033 195
Table 4.5: This table explores the relationship between the mean grade, mean per-
formance levels, and mean activity levels between QI rarity in datasets in which one
QI variable has been omitted. In every variable except for the number of chapters, we
see that when the number of forum posts (which, for every variable, has the highest
correlation between its frequency with values of the numeric attributes) is omitted as a
QI variable, the resulting mean of the numeric attribute is highest. This supports the
hypothesis that a high negative correlation between QI frequency with a given numeric
attribute may skew the variable downward during the de-identification process. Al-
though we do observe that the variable with the highest correlation between QI rarity
and grade also tends to have the highest mean of numeric attributes, there does not
appear to be a strong relationship present between the other variables.
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From these analyses, it therefore appears that there may exist a benefit in completely
omitting quasi-identifier attributes from a dataset if the rarity of their values is highly
correlated with many numeric attributes. In doing so, the loss of information caused by
the exclusion of the attributes must be taken into account. The number of forum posts,
for example, may not be too important of a quasi-identifier attribute to be kept in the
dataset, since it does not provide valuable demographic information and is a measure of
activity that is correlated with other non-quasi-identifier measures of activity (like the
number of video plays, for example). On the other hand, if “gender” or “year of birth”
were to be excluded, this may significantly hinder analyses of student performance based
on demographic traits, which may be more undesirable than a slightly skewed dataset.
The suppression of quasi-identifier columns whose rarity of values is highly correlated
with numeric attributes has the same effect as decreasing the amount of sample bias.
Thus, an improvement in sampling methods in order to ensure the balance of background
covariates (and thereby quasi-identifier attributes) is another way to reduce the amount
of bias introduced to a dataset.
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4.5 The effect of the correlation of QI rarity with grade on
statistical bias
So far, we have observed that 1. as k is increased, the amount of bias that is introduced
by the k-anonymization process increases, and 2. the suppression of the forum posts
column, whose frequency has the highest negative correlation with performance and
activity metrics, resulted in the highest increase in the de-identified mean of performance
and activity metrics. Both of these observations support our hypothesis that, as the
absolute value of the correlation between the frequency of a given quasi-identifier field’s
occurrence increases with a non-sensitive column (such as grade), the skew of that non-
sensitive column will increase.
In order to concretely test this hypothesis further, we now alter given quasi-identifier
fields in order to have different correlations with numeric attributes and then explore
the skewness of the resulting de-identified datasets. Due to the heavy skew of grades
towards zero in this dataset, we expect that a highly negative correlation between forum
post value frequency will create a higher degree of negative bias in grade than a highly
positive correlation will create a positive bias.
We perform this analysis on a random subset of about a quarter of the total rows in the
original dataset – 100,000 rows. Then, a vector is generated whose values represent the
frequencies of occurrence of a randomly-generated number of forum posts whose sum is
constrained to equal the number of rows in the dataset. Then, each of these frequencies
are assigned to a given record in multiple permutations in order to generate different
simulated correlations between the frequency of a given value of the number of forum
posts with grade. These datasets are then k-anonymized with k=5, and the bias of the
grade variable for each of these different is then analyzed.
The first graph below reports the relationship between the entropy of the grade vector
after k-anonymizaton (where k = 5) and the different correlated frequencies. Here we
see that when correlation between the forum post frequency and grade is low, then the
entropy of the data is high, suggesting that high grades are being dropped, which creates
a more homogeneous population of grades. As the correlation between the forum post
frequency and grade increases, the entropy decreases, which suggests that fewer unique
values are being dropped.
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Figure 4.9: This graph shows the relationship between the correlation of a specific
quasi-identifier attribute with grade versus the entropy of the entire dataset. We see,
in general, that the entropy decreases as the correlation becomes higher. This can
be explained by he fact that increasingly positive correlations correspond to less rare
values becoming dropped, and therefore a lower degree of information loss introduced
by the de-identification process.
We also observe that the mean of the anonymized dataset is skewed most severely
downward when the correlation is the most negative, and then approaches the true
mean of the dataset as the correlation increases. This is because a highly negative
correlation means that rarer QI values are more associated with higher values of grade,
meaning that these high grades are more likely to be dropped from the dataset and
therefore decrease the overall mean of the dataset.
Figure 4.10: As expected, a relationship is seen in which, the more negative the
correlation between quasi-identifier frequency with grade, the more negative the bias
in terms of the mean grade in the de-identified dataset. This is explained by the fact
that a negative correlation corresponds to high values of grade being associated with
rare values of the number of forum posts, meaning that these records with high grades
are more likely to be dropped from the dataset.
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4.6 The effect of generalization versus suppression on sta-
tistical bias
We have now observed through three different analyses that the unequal distribution of
quasi-identifier frequencies may introduce bias into a dataset during the de-identification
process. However, one factor whose effect on bias we have not yet explored is the bal-
ance between generalization and suppression in de-identifying the dataset. In order to
faithfully replicate the anonymization process used to de-identify edX data for public
release in 2014, all above analyses employed a “suppression-emphasis” approach toward
k-anonymization. In this approach, the names of the countries were first generalized to
region or continent names, then date-time stamps were transformed into date stamps,
and finally any existing rows that were not k-anonymous after these generalizations be-
came suppressed. In the process, records were removed whose date of birth corresponded
to years before 1931.
However, it is reasonable to question the effect that adjustments to the balance between
generalization and suppression may have on the bias introduced into certain numeric at-
tributes. Generalization of attributes decreases the need for the suppression of records
by monotonically increasing the size of each equivalence class and thus decreasing the
chance that a record will need to be suppressed in order to satisfy k-anonymity. How-
ever, the inferences that can be drawn from generalized values are often less powerful
than those that can be drawn from more granular values – for example, correlations may
be hard to calculate with binned numeric attributes.
Since our above analysis indicated that the uneven distribution of the number of forum
posts may be a contributing factor to the introduction of bias into the de-identified edX
dataset, we explore the effect of generalization of this attribute, where k in k-anonymity
is maintained at 5. Most basically, we observe that as the bin size for the number of
forum posts increases, there is an increased range of values of the number of forum posts
that are represented in the resulting de-identified dataset. This can be seen in the below
table, where the upper bound for the number of forum posts increases from 7 to 17 as the
bin size increases from 1 to 6. This can be explained by the fact that broader bins result
in a higher number of records with given values of the forum post quasi-identifier, and
this decreases the chance of associated records from being suppressed from the dataset.
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Bin size Unique forum post values
1 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
2 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9
3 0-2, 3-5, 6-8, 12-14
4 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, 12-15
5 0-4, 5-9, 10-14
6 0-5, 6-11, 12-17
Table 4.6: As the bin size for the number of forum posts increases, there is an increased
range of values of the number of forum posts that is represented in the resulting dataset.
Below is a table reporting summary statistics for de-identified datasets that result after
binning forum posts with bin sizes ranging from 1 (i.e., the original values) through 6
(i.e., 0-5, 6-11, etc.).
# Forum Posts: Bin Size
1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of records 352278 360420 364499 366736 368401 369618
% Male 61.4% 61.2% 61.1% 61.0% 60.9% 60.9%
% Viewed 57.5% 58.3% 58.7% 58.9% 59.1% 59.2%
% Explored 6.2% 6.6% 6.9% 7.1% 7.2% 7.4%
% Certified 2.0% 2.3% 2.5% 2.7% 2.8% 2.9%
Table 4.7: Table of summary statistics describing changes in the data as the original
dataset is de-identified with different bin sizes for the number of forum posts, all at the
k = 5 anonymity level.
We observe that the dataset size increases as the bin size increases, which is consis-
tent with the observation that generalization increases the size of equivalence classes
and therefore decreases the number of rows that must be suppressed. Furthermore,
we notice that performance metrics also increase as the bin size increases, suggesting
that generalization may alleviate bias by preventing records associated with rarer quasi-
identifier values from becoming suppressed.
In order to confirm this hypothesis, we plot the relationship between the bin size of
the number of forum posts with mean grade, performance, and activity levels, as shown
below.
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Figure 4.11: As the size of the forum post bin size increases in a k-anonymity frame-
work, we observe an increase in the mean grade, performance, and activity levels,
likely due to the fact that the generalization allows more values to be included in the
de-identified versions. Thus, this may suggest that above findings regarding the bias in-
troduced by de-identification can be counteracted by using a more generalization-heavy
anonymization approach.
As expected, as the amount of generalization increases (i.e., as forum post bin size in-
creases), we see that the mean grade, performance, and activity levels all become less
biased, and thus approach their true values. This can be explained by the fact that the
binning increases the representation of each equivalence class, in effect increasing the
threshold at which records associated with higher grades and performance were cut off.
If increased generalization is associated with decreased bias, then why would a k-
anonymization approach that emphasizes suppression ever be employed? In order to
understand the tradeoffs that are involved in using generalization over suppression, we
measure the utility of de-identified datasets that are produced using multiple bin sizes.
The results are shown in the below table.
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Bin size DM Avg(| EqCl |) Entropy 1-Qdiv
1 2.81 x 1010 27.0 203 0.479
2 2.47 x 1010 27.4 206 0.481
3 2.30 x 1010 27.5 208 0.483
4 2.21 x 1010 27.7 209 0.481
5 2.14 x 1010 27.8 210 0.482
6 2.08 x 1010 27.8 210 0.482
Table 4.8: As the bin size for the number of forum posts increases, there is a loss of
data utility in terms of average equivalence class size and entropy, but an increase in
the data utility in terms of the discernibility metric.
Recalling that, for each of the four reported utility metrics, higher values are associated
with lower utility, we observe that increased bin sizes are associated with an improved
discernibility metric but decreased utility in terms of average equivalence class size and
entropy. This follows from the fact that the discernibility metric heavily penalizes for
suppressed rows, so increasing the amount of generalization necessarily decreases the
amount of suppression and thus improves the ability to distinguish between different
records.
However, the average equivalence class size is worsened as generalization increases be-
cause, among non-suppressed records, the number of records with a given set of quasi-
identifiers becomes larger and therefore it is harder to associate a given record with
precise quasi-identifier values, which decreases the utility of the dataset. Similarly, since
equivalence class sizes are increased, there is a decreased ability to characterize a record
from other records, and therefore the dataset’s entropy decreases. Therefore, we observe
that the utility of the dataset is decreased in the sense that it becomes more difficult to
distinguish between records in terms of their quasi-identifier characteristics.
Stemming from these findings, we also note that generalization makes it difficult to draw
statistical conclusions from a dataset due to its discretization of numeric attributes. The
mean of a column that has undergone generalization can be maintained by computing
a weighted mean of the pre-discretized values and then reporting this value as the “bin
average” in the de-identified dataset. By averaging these bin averages, the resulting
mean will represent the true mean of the pre-discretized values.
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Such a solution cannot be easily derived for two-dimensional relationships between gener-
alized values, however. Consider the below table, which reports the correlations between
the number of forum posts in the original dataset with various numeric attributes in the
left column, and then compares this to the correlation between the “bin average” value
for various bin sizes with the same numeric attributes.
Correlations of forum posts with numeric attributes
Bin size
Original 1 2 3 4 5 6
Grade 0.159 0.105 0.0980 0.0919 0.0833 0.0732 0.0533
Viewed 0.0444 0.0683 0.0582 0.0462 0.0372 0.0294 0.0228
Explored 0.127 0.0744 0.0710 0.0661 0.0620 0.0554 0.0418
Certified 0.152 0.0868 0.0810 0.0758 0.0699 0.0598 0.0482
# Active Days 0.236 0.117 0.111 0.106 0.0940 0.0855 0.0649
# Chapters 0.154 0.143 0.127 0.115 0.100 0.0858 0.0715
# Events 0.283 0.103 0.103 0.0964 0.0986 0.0913 0.0597
# VIdeo Plays 0.0929 0.0943 0.105 0.103 0.125 0.110 0.0683
Table 4.9: This table describes the change in correlations between the number of
forum posts and other numeric attributes as the degree of generalization of the number
of forum posts is increased. Note that the first column represents the true correlations
in the original dataset. All of these analyses hold are for k-anonymization where k = 5.
Strikingly, the correlation between the number of forum posts with every numeric at-
tribute except for the viewed attribute becomes more biased as the number of bins
increase. Noting that the column corresponding to a bin size of 1 represents the “sup-
pression emphasis” k-anonymization approach, and that its correlations are consistently
the closest to the original correlations, this suggests that generalization distorts aspects
of joint relationships between variables through its discretization of values.
Thus, we have encountered the fundamental tradeoff between generalization and sup-
pression that was discussed earlier – although an approach emphasizing suppression
may introduce bias in a given numeric attribute if there exists a quasi-identifier whose
frequency is correlated with the numeric attribute, generalization may also inherently
distort datasets in terms of correlational and other multidimensional relationships.
One potential improvement to generalization may be to more evenly distribute the bin
sizes, using fine bucket sizes for values that are well-represented and using larger bucket
sizes for less well-represented values. We create a dataset with mixed bucket sizes, gen-
eralizing the number of forum posts into bins of size five for values above 10, to be
consistent with the schema that was used in the “generalization emphasis” anonymiza-
tion approach employed by the edX team. The resulting de-identified dataset under this
mixed generalization schema had the following unique values of the number of forum
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posts: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11-15. Note that representation for 8, 9, and 10 forum posts
was low enough that all such records had to be suppressed. We also analyzed the utility
of the resulting dataset with mixed bin sizes, and report the values below.
Bin size DM Avg(| EqCl |) Entropy 1-Qdiv
1 2.815 x 1010 27.0 203 0.479
Mixed 2.814 x 1010 27.0 203 0.478
Table 4.10: A non-uniform bin size (i.e., bin size of 1 for values below 11 and bin size
5 above 11) is characterized by very similar utility values than the de-identified dataset
that results from simply using a bin size of 1.
In terms of utility, we see that this resulting dataset is quite comparable to the de-
identified dataset that only used a bin size of 1. The mixed bin sizes therefore do not
provide a significant improvement in terms of the number of suppressed rows (as seen by
the relatively high discernibility metric), but they are advantageous in the fact that they
do not cause an increase in the average equivalence class size or in entropy, meaning that
records remain fairly distinguishable from each other in terms of their quasi-identifier
characteristics.
Correlations of forum posts with numeric attributes
Bin size
Original 1 Mixed
Grade 0.159 0.105 0.990
Viewed 0.0444 0.0683 0.0635
Explored 0.127 0.0744 0.0700
Certified 0.152 0.0868 0.0815
# Active Days 0.236 0.117 0.110
# Chapters 0.154 0.143 0.138
# Events 0.283 0.103 0.0950
# VIdeo Plays 0.0929 0.0943 0.0943
Table 4.11: This table describes the change in correlations between the number of
forum posts and other numeric attributes with mixed bin sizes as compared with no
generalization (i.e., bin size of 1). Note that the first column represents the true corre-
lations in the original dataset. All of these analyses hold are for k-anonymization where
k = 5.
Similarly, this table reveals that the de-identified dataset that uses mixed bin sizes has
correlations that are farther from the true values than the de-identified dataset that does
not bin the number of forum posts (i.e., where bin size is 1), but that are significantly
closer to the true correlation values than datasets that use consistently larger bin sizes
(i.e., bins of size 2 or more).
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This suggests that using bin sizes that optimize for equal numbers of records within each
bin may provide a compromise between the loss of utility and the distortions caused in
numeric analysis like correlations between different variables.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and future directions
This paper has primarily explored the relationship between quasi-identifier characteris-
tics as a possible source of bias and loss of utility during the k-anonymization process. By
requiring that each equivalence class have a minimum size of at least k, k-anonymization
decreases the ability for adversaries to re-identify records by joining them with outside
datasets. In doing so, however, there is a chance that bias is introduced into the dataset
by unevenly suppressing records with certain characteristics.
We hypothesized that, in particular, the strength of the correlation between numeric
attributes and the frequency of occurrence of quasi-identifier values was a large deter-
minant of how biased a given de-identified dataset would become. Visual explorations
of de-identified data available through a massive online open course platform, edX, sug-
gested that a relationship between quasi-identifier frequency did indeed exist with other
numeric attributes.
By modifying factors that affect the relationship between correlations of quasi-identifier
value frequencies with other numeric attributes, we confirm the possibility that correla-
tions between the frequency of quasi-identifier attributes with other numeric attributes
are a contributing source of bias and loss of utility. Specifically, we investigated three
factors in their contributions to this bias.
I. Increasing the value of k in k-anonymity. In a situation where a quasi-
identifier field’s frequency of values is correlated to a numeric attribute, increasing
the value of k is akin to changing the quasi-identifier rarity threshold at which a
given record must be cut. If a quasi-identifier’s rarest values are more often tied
to either high or low numeric attributes, this therefore would suggest that higher
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levels of k (which correspond to greater anonymity requirements) would create
biases in the resulting de-identified dataset’s numeric attributes. We did indeed
witness this trend: higher values of k corresponded to downward skews in terms
of numeric attributes, caused by the negative correlation between quasi-identifier
fields’ frequency of occurrence with numeric attributes. This suggests that the
combination of correlated quasi-identifier field frequencies with high levels of k
may be particularly dangerous in introducing bias into a dataset.
II. Eliminating quasi-identifier fields with high correlations of value fre-
quency to numeric attributes. Given a quasi-identifier field with a high cor-
relation between the frequency of its values with numeric attributes, there may
be value in simply omitting the entire field rather than allowing it to create bias
within the dataset. In this case, a balance must be maintained between the value
of the information encoded in the quasi-identifier field versus the bias created in
the dataset.
It appears from initial findings that a weak relationship between the correlation of
a given quasi-identifier field’s value frequency with a numeric attribute may exist.
Specifically, omitting quasi-identifier fields whose rarity correlation with a numeric
field has an absolute value of above 0.25 appeared to correspond the most with
noticeable improvements in the bias introduced by de-identification.
III. Increasing the correlation between quasi-identifier value frequency with
given numeric attributes. The manual alteration of quasi-identifier values con-
firmed our hypothesis that the amount of bias introduced during the de-identification
process may be related to the magnitude of the correlation between quasi-identifier
value frequency with that attribute. Due to the fact that numeric attributes like
grade in our dataset are highly skewed toward values near 0, this meant that
situations in which rare quasi-identifier values are associated with high values of
grade caused the most bias in the data. (Naturally, however, if the grades had
been skewed toward higher values, rare quasi-identifier values’ association with
low values of grade would have caused the most bias in the data.)
All three of the experiments performed above support the hypothesis that high corre-
lations between quasi-identifier value frequency with numeric attributes is a cause of
the introduction of bias within those fields in datasets. Furthermore, the results lend
interesting insights into what factors may be responsible for the introduction of bias into
a dataset. For example, suppressing the number of forum posts quasi-identifier column
had a much greater impact on the mean grade of the anonymized dataset (from 0.045 to
0.061, a change of +0.016) than did increasing the value of k in k-anonymization from
1 to 5 (which changed the mean grade from 0.045 to 0.036, a change of -0.009). On
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the other hand, suppression of other columns did not have as great an impact on the
mean of numeric attributes as did the increase in k (which corresponds to an increase
in the suppression of rows). The interaction between these factors would be a powerful
relationship to quantify. Similar analyses could also be done with regards to the effect
of adding noise to rows versus adding noise to columns.
Importantly, all of the experiments used a k-anonymization scheme with a given balance
of suppression versus generalization, in which countries were generalized into continent or
region names, time stamps were generalized to dates, and all remaining records that did
not satisfy k-anonymity were suppressed. This approach that emphasizes suppression
may have caused a disproportionate bias in resulting activity and performance metrics
than would a generalization-emphasizing approach.
To this end, our analyses showed that increased generalization decreased the bias in-
troduced into grade, activity, and performance metrics. However, this increase in gen-
eralization was also associated with a loss in data utility as measured by the average
equivalence class size and by entropy, due to the fact that generalization blurs the as-
sociation between records and their quasi-identifier characteristics. Furthermore, the
larger the bin size of a generalized attribute, the less accurate statistical analyses with
that attribute become, such as its correlation with other columns. This can also affect
the ability of researchers to perform analyses like linear regression using generalized
attributes. Further research into the effect of anonymization schemes that emphasize
suppression versus generalization may be able to shed more light onto how to find an
optimal balance between the two.
Another future direction for research that may alleviate the bias of these numeric at-
tributes is the use of swapping of quasi-identifier values. Swapping of quasi-identifier
rows can solve two problems. First, it prevents the need for rows to be suppressed and
therefore lessens the amount of bias that is introduced into the dataset via suppression.
Second, it provides a way to reduce the correlation between certain quasi-identifier’s
value frequencies with numeric attributes, therefore lessening the amount of bias that is
introduced when the final k-anonymization step is performed.
Valuable findings may also come from the performance of similar analyses on other
datasets. For example, the edX dataset’s numeric attributes tended to be highly skewed
toward low performers – it may be interesting to perform the same analyses for datasets
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whose numeric attributes are more evenly distributed. Furthermore, it would be in-
teresting to observe how different the resulting analyses would be on datasets with
fewer or greater numbers of quasi-identifier attributes. With different numbers of quasi-
identifiers, the degree of the effect of a high correlation between a single quasi-identifier’s
frequency with another numeric column may be changed.
Of course, all of these analyses have been performed with a focus on minimizing the
bias introduced into datasets. However, bias may not always be the ideal error metric
to optimize for – for example, a dataset where suppression removes the records with
the ten lowest grades might experience an upward bias in the mean grade, but might
retain the two-dimensional relationships between grades with other attributes that allow
accurate linear regressions to be fit to the data. By this same logic, certain modifica-
tions that are made in order to increase the integrity of the de-identification process
(by some definition of integrity that a researcher would like to optimize for) may be
more amenable to allow researchers to have a more accurate measure of the accuracy
of their resulting analyses, through measures like confidence intervals or standard errors.
Clearly, there exist many opportunities for future research that can optimize the k-
anonymization process for certain tasks. More generally, these modifications to the
de-identification process enable data to be increasingly used in a way that protects the
privacy of the individuals whose data is being shared, but that also provides utility to
researchers who will be using it.
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